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Abstract
Bernard et al. (2015) study an optimal insurance design problem where an individual’s
preference is of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) type, and show that in general an optimal
contract covers both large and small losses. However, their contracts suffer from a problem of
moral hazard for paying more compensation for a smaller loss. This paper addresses this setback
by exogenously imposing the constraint that both the indemnity function and the insured’s
retention function be increasing with respect to the loss. We characterize the optimal solutions
via calculus of variations, and then apply the result to obtain explicitly expressed contracts for
problems with Yaari’s dual criterion and general RDU. Finally, we use a numerical example to
compare the results between ours and that of Bernard et al. (2015).
Keywords: optimal insurance design, rank-dependent utility theory, Yaari’s dual criterion,
probability weighting function, moral hazard, indemnity function, retention function, quantile
formulation.
∗Department of Applied Mathematics, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Kowloon, Hong Kong. Email:
maxu@polyu.edu.hk. This author acknowledges financial supports from Hong Kong Early Career Scheme (No.
533112), Hong Kong General Research Fund (No. 529711) and NNSF of China (No. 11471276).
†Mathematical Institute and Nomura Centre for Mathematical Finance, and Oxford–Man Institute of Quantitative
Finance, The University of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK. This author acknowledges supports from a start-up fund of
the University of Oxford, and research grants from the Nomura Centre for Mathematical Finance and the Oxford–Man
Institute of Quantitative Finance.
‡Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, N2L 3G1, Canada.
1
1 Introduction
Optimal insurance contract design is an important problem, manifested not only in theory but also in
insurance and financial practices. The problem is to determine the optimal amount of compensation
as a function of the loss – called indemnity – so as to maximize the insured’s satisfaction, subject to
the participation constraint of the insurer.
In the insurance literature, most of the work assume that the insurer is risk neutral while the
insured is a risk-averse expected utility (EU) maximizer; see e.g. Arrow (1963), Raviv (1979), and
Gollier and Schlesinger (1996). In this case, the optimal contract is in general a deductible one that
covers part of the loss in excess of a deductible level.
However, the EU theory has received many criticisms, for it fails to explain numerous experimental
observations and theoretical puzzles. In the context of insurance contracting, the classical EU-based
models cannot explain some behaviors in insurance demand such as that for small losses (e.g. demand
for warranties); see a detailed discussion in Bernard et al. (2015).
In order to overcome this drawback of the EU theory, different measures of evaluating uncertain
outcomes have been put forward to depict human behaviors. A notable one is the rank-dependent
utility (RDU) proposed by Quiggin (1982), which consists of a concave utility function and an
inverse-S shaped probability weighting (or distortion) function.1 Through the probability weighting,
the RDU theory captures the common observation that people tend to exaggerate small probabilities
of extremely good and bad outcomes. With the development of advanced mathematical tools, the
RDU preference has been applied to many areas of finance, including portfolio choice and option
pricing. On the other hand, Barseghyan et al. (2013) use data on households’ insurance deductible
decisions in auto and home insurance to demonstrate the relevance and importance of the probability
weighting and suggest the possibility of generalizing their conclusions to other insurance choices.
There have been also studies in the area of insurance contract design within the RDU framework;
see for example Chateauneuf, Dana and Tallon (2000), Dana and Scarsini (2007), and Carlier and
Dana (2008). However, all these papers assume that the probability weighting function is convex.
Bernard et al. (2015) are probably the first to study RDU-based insurance contracting with inverse-
S shaped weighting functions, using the quantile formulation originally developed for portfolio choice
(Jin and Zhou 2008, He and Zhou 2011). They derive optimal contracts that not only insure large
losses above a deductible level but also cover small ones. However, their contracts suffer from a severe
1The RDU preference reduces to Yaari’s dual criterion (Yaari 1987) when the utility function is the identity one.
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problem of moral hazard, since they are not increasing with respect to the losses.2 As a consequence,
insureds may be motivated to hide their true losses in order to obtain additional compensations; see
a discussion on pp. 175–176 of Bernard et al. (2015).
This paper aims to address this setback. We consider the same insurance model as in Bernard
et al. (2015), but adding an explicit constraint that both the indemnity function and the insured’s
retention function (i.e. the part of the losses to be born by the insured) must be globally increasing
with respect to the losses. This constraint will rule out completely the aforementioned behaviour of
moral hazard; yet mathematically it gives rise to substantial difficulty. The approach used in Bernard
et al. (2015) no longer works. We develop a general approach to overcome this difficulty. Specifically,
we first derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for optimal solutions via calculus of variations.
Then we deduce explicitly expressed optimal contracts by a fine analysis on these conditions. An
interesting finding is that, for a good and reasonable range of parameters specifications, there are
only two types of optima contracts, one being the classical deductible one and the other a “three-fold"
one covering both small and large losses.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the optimal insurance
model under the RDU framework including its quantile formulation. Section 3 applies the calculus
of variations to derive a general necessary and sufficient condition for optimal solutions. We then
derive optimal contracts for Yaari’s criterion and the general RDU in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
Section 6 provides a numerical example to illustrate our results. Finally, we conclude with Section
7. Proofs of some lemmas are placed in an Appendix.
2 The Model
In this section, we present the optimal insurance contracting model in which the insured has the RDU
type of preferences, followed by its quantile formulation that will facilitate deriving the solutions.
2.1 Problem formulation
We follow Bernard et al. (2015) for the problem formulation except for one critical difference, which
we will highlight. Let (Ω,F,P) be a probability space. An insured, endowed with an initial wealth
2Throughout this paper, by an “increasing” function we mean a “non-decreasing” function, namely f is increasing
if f(x) > f(y) whenever x > y. We say f is “strictly increasing” if f(x) > f(y) whenever x > y. Similar conventions
are used for “decreasing” and “strictly decreasing” functions.
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W0, faces a non-negative random loss X supported in [0,M ], where M is a given positive scalar.
He chooses an insurance contract to protect himself from the loss, by paying a premium π to the
insurer in return for a compensation (or indemnity) in the case of a loss. This compensation is to
be determined as a function of the loss X, denoted by I(·) throughout this paper. The retention
function R(X) := X − I(X) is thereby the part of the loss to be borne by the insured.
For a given X, the insured aims to choose an insurance contract that provides the best tradeoff
between the premium and compensation based on his risk preference. In this paper, we consider the
case when insured’s preference is of the RDU type. This RDU preference consists of two components:
a utility function u : R+ 7→ R+ and a probability weighting function T : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1]. Let us denote
by V rdu(W ) the RDU of the final (random) wealth W of an insured, which is a Choquet integral of
u(W ) with respect to the capacity T ◦ P, i.e.,
V rdu(W ) =
∫
u(W )d(T ◦ P) :=
∫
R+
u(x)d[−T (1− FW (x))],
where FW (·) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of W . Assuming that T is differentiable,
we can rewrite
V rdu(W ) =
∫
R+
u(x)T ′(1− FW (x))dFW (x).
If T is inverse-S shaped, that is, it is first concave and then convex; see Figure 1, then the above
expression shows that the role T plays is to overweigh both tails of W when evaluating the mean of
u(W ). On the other hand, if the insurer is risk-neutral and the cost of offering the compensation is
proportional to the expectation of the indemnity, then the premium to be charged for an insurance
contract should satisfy the participation constraint
π > (1 + ρ)E[I(X)],
where the constant ρ is the safety loading of the insurer.
It is natural to require an indemnity function to satisfy
I(0) = 0, 0 6 I(x) 6 x, ∀ 0 6 x 6 M, (1)
a constraint that has been imposed in most insurance contracting literature. If the insured’s pref-
erence is dictated by the classical EU theory, then the optimal contract is typically a deductible
contract which automatically renders the indemnity function increasing; see e.g. Arrow (1971) and
Raviv (1979). However, for the RDU preference the resulting optimal indemnity may not be an
increasing function, as shown in Bernard et al. (2015). This may potentially cause moral hazard
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as pointed out earlier. Similarly, a non-monotone retention function may also lead to moral hazard.
Consequently, to include the increasing constraint on the contract has been an outstanding open
question.
In this paper, we require the indemnity function to satisfy I(0) = 0 and 0 6 I(x) − I(y) 6
x− y, ∀ 0 6 y < x 6M . In other words, we constrain both indemnity and retention functions to be
globally increasing.
We can now formulate our insurance contracting problem as
max
I(·)
V rdu(W0 − π −X + I(X))
s.t. (1 + ρ)E[I(X)] 6 π,
I(·) ∈ I,
(2)
where
I := {I(·) : I(0) = 0, 0 6 I(x)− I(y) 6 x− y, ∀ 0 6 y 6 x 6M},
and W0 and π are fixed scalars.
For any random variable Y > 0 a.s., define the quantile function of Y as
F−1Y (t) := inf{x ∈ R
+ : P (Y 6 x) > t}, t ∈ [0, 1].
Note that any quantile function is nonnegative, increasing and left-continuous (ILC).
We now introduce the following assumptions that will be used hereafter.
Assumption 2.1 The random loss X has a strictly increasing distribution function FX . Moreover,
F−1X is absolutely continuous on [0, 1].
Assumption 2.2 (Concave Utility) The utility function u : R+ 7→ R+ is strictly increasing and
continuously differentiable. Furthermore, u′ is decreasing.
Assumption 2.3 (Inverse-S Shaped Weighting) The probability weighting function T is a continu-
ous and strictly increasing mapping from [0,1] onto [0,1] and twice differentiable on (0, 1). Moreover,
there exists b ∈ (0, 1) such that T ′(·) is strictly decreasing on (0, b) and strictly increasing on (b, 1).
Furthermore, T ′(0+) := limz↓0 T
′(z) > 1 and T ′(1−) := limz↑1 T
′(z) = +∞.
The first part of Assumption 2.1, crucial for the quantile formulation, is standard; see e.g. Raviv
(1979). Note a significant difference from Bernard et al. (2015) is that here we allow X to have
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atoms (which is usually the case in the insurance context). For example, let X be distributed with
FX(x) =
1−γe−ηx
1−γe−ηM
for x ∈ [0,M ], where γ ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0. Then, X satisfies Assumption
2.1, and has an atom at 0 with the probability P(X = 0) = 1−γ
1−γe−ηM
> 0. This assumption also
ensures that F−1X (FX(x)) ≡ x, ∀ x ∈ [0,M ], a fact that will be used often in the subsequent analysis.
Next, Assumption 2.2 is standard for a utility function. Finally, Assumption 2.3 is satisfied for many
weighting functions proposed or used in the literature, e.g. that proposed by Tversky and Kahneman
(1992) (parameterized by θ):
Tθ(x) =
xθ
(xθ + (1− x)θ)
1
θ
. (3)
Figure 1 displays this (inverse-S shaped) weighting function (in blue) when θ = 0.5.
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Figure 1: An inverse-S shaped weighting function satisfying Assumption 2.3. The marked points a
and c will be explained later.
In practice, most of the insurance contracts are not tailor-made for individual customers. Instead,
an insurance company usually has contracts with different premiums to accommodate customers
with different needs. Each contract is designed with the best interest of a representative customer
in mind so as to stay marketable and competitive, while maintaining the desired profitability (the
participation constraint). An insured can then choose one from the menu of contracts to cater for
individual needs. Problem (2) is therefore motivated by the insurer’s making of this menu.
If the premium π > (1 + ρ)E[X ], then I∗(x) ≡ x (corresponding to a full coverage) is feasible
and maximizes the objective function in Problem (2) pointwisely; hence optimal. To rule out this
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trivial case, henceforth we restrict 0 < π < (1 + ρ)E[X ]. Moreover, we assume
W0 − (1 + ρ)E[X ]−M > 0, (4)
to ensure that the policyholder will not go bankrupt. This is because W0 − π − M > 0, ∀ π ∈
(0, (1 + ρ)E[X ]).
It is more convenient to consider the retention function R(x) = x − I(x) instead of I(x) in
our study below. Letting ∆ := E[X ] − π
1+ρ
∈ (0, E[X ]), W := W0 − (1 + ρ)E[X ] > 0, W∆ :=
W + (1 + ρ)∆ ≡W0 − π, we can reformulate (2) in terms of R(·):
max
R(·)
V rdu(W∆ −R(X))
s.t. E[R(X)] > ∆,
R(·) ∈ R,
(5)
where
R := {R(·) : R(0) = 0, 0 6 R(x)−R(y) 6 x− y, ∀ 0 6 y 6 x 6M}.
2.2 Quantile Formulation
The objective function in (5) is not concave in R(X) (due to the nonlinear weighting function T ),
leading to a major difficulty in solving (5). However, under Assumption 2.3, we have
V rdu(W∆ − R(X)) =
∫
R+
u(x)d[−T (1− FW∆−R(X)(x))]
=
∫ 1
0
u(F−1
W∆−R(X)
(z))T ′(1− z)dz =
∫ 1
0
u(W∆ − F
−1
R(X)(1− z))T
′(1− z)dz
=
∫ 1
0
u(W∆ − F
−1
R(X)(z))T
′(z)dz,
where the third equality is because F−1
W∆−R(X)
(z) = W∆ − F
−1
R(X)(1− z) except for a countable set of
z. On the other hand, E[R(X)] > ∆ is equivalent to
∫ 1
0
F−1
R(X)(z)dz > ∆.
The above suggests that we may change the decision variable from the random variable R(X) to
its quantile function F−1
R(X), with which the objective function of (5) becomes concave and the first
constraint is linear. It remains to rewrite the monotonicity constraint (represented by the constraint
set R) also in terms of F−1
R(X). To this end, the next lemma plays an important role.
Lemma 2.1 Under Assumption 2.1, for any given R(·) ∈ R, we have
R(x) = F−1
R(X)(FX(x)), ∀ x ∈ [0,M ].
7
Proof: First, by the monotonicity of R(·), we have P(R(X) 6 R(x)) > P(X 6 x) = FX(x), so
by the definition of F−1
R(X)(FX(x)), we conclude that F
−1
R(X)(FX(x)) 6 R(x). It suffices to prove the
reverse inequality. Consider two cases.
• R(x) = 0: In this case, we have F−1
R(X)(FX(x)) = 0 as quantile functions are nonnegative.
• R(x) > 0: It suffices to prove that P(R(X) 6 z) < FX(x) for any z < R(x). Take z1 such that
z < z1 < R(x). By the continuity and monotonicity of R(·), there exists y such that y < x and
R(y) = z1. Then, P(R(X) 6 z) 6 P(R(X) < z1) = P(R(X) < R(y)) 6 P(X 6 y) = FX(y) <
FX(x), where we have used the fact that FX is strictly increasing under Assumption 2.1.
The claim is thus proved. 
In view of the above results, we can rewrite (5) as the following problem, in which the decision
variable is F−1
R(X)(·) (denoted by G(·) for simplicity):
max
G(·)
∫ 1
0
u(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z)dz,
s.t.
∫ 1
0
G(z)dz > ∆,
G(·) ∈ G,
(6)
where G := {F−1
R(X)(·) : R(·) ∈ R}.
In the absence of an explicit expression the constraint set G is hard to deal with. The following
result addresses this issue. Note the major technical difficulty arises from the possible existence of
the atoms of X.
Lemma 2.2 Under Assumption 2.1, we have
G = {G(·) : G(·) is absolutely continuous, G(0) = 0, 0 6 G′(z) 6 (F−1X )
′(z), a.e. z ∈ [0, 1]}. (7)
Proof: We denote the right hand side of (7) by G1. For any G(·) ∈ G, there exists R(·) ∈ R
such that G(·) = F−1
R(X)(·). For any 0 6 b < a 6 1, define a = inf{x ∈ [0,M ] : R(x) = G(a)},
a = sup{x ∈ [0,M ] : R(x) = G(a)}, define b and b similarly. Let us show that a 6 F−1X (a) 6 a. In
fact, by definition,
F−1X (a) = inf{x ∈ R
+ : FX(x) > a} > inf{x ∈ R
+ : G(FX(x)) > G(a)}
= inf{x ∈ R+ : R(x) > G(a)} = a.
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Suppose F−1X (a)− ε > a for some ε > 0. Then by monotonicity,
G(a) = R(a) < R(F−1X (a)− ε) = G(FX(F
−1
X (a)− ε)) 6 G(a),
where we have used the fact that FX(F
−1
X (a) − ε) < a to get the last inequality. This leads to a
contradiction; hence it must hold that F−1X (a) 6 a. Similarly, we can prove b 6 F
−1
X (b) 6 b. Then
we have
0 6 G(a)−G(b) = R(a)−R(b) 6 a− b 6 F−1X (a)− F
−1
X (b).
This inequality shows that G is absolutely continuous since F−1X is an absolutely continuous function
under Assumption 2.1. Furthermore, it also implies 0 6 G′(z) 6 (F−1X )
′(z)), a.e. z ∈ [0, 1]. So we
have established that G ⊆ G1.
To prove the reverse inclusion, take any G(·) ∈ G1 and define R(·) = G(FX(·)). It follows from
Assumption 2.1 that 0 6 R(0) = G(FX(0))−G(0) 6 F
−1
X (FX(0))−F
−1
X (0) = 0 and 0 6 R(a)−R(b) =
G(FX(a)) − G(FX(b)) 6 F
−1
X (FX(a)) − F
−1
X (FX(b)) = a − b ∀0 6 b < a 6 1. Hence R(·) ∈ R. It
now suffices to show G(a) = F−1
R(X)(a) for any 0 6 a 6 1. If G(a) = 0, then G(a) 6 F
−1
R(X)(a) holds.
Otherwise, for any s < G(a), there exists y such that s < R(y) = G(FX(y)) < G(a) by the continuity
of R(·). Then by the monotonicity of R(·) and G(·), we have
P(R(X) 6 s) 6 P(R(X) < R(y)) 6 P(X 6 y) = FX(y) < a,
which means G(a) 6 F−1
R(X)(a). Using the same notation, a, as above, and noting that G(a) =
R(a) = G(FX(a)), we have a 6 FX(a) by the definition of a and the continuity of R(·). Moreover,
it follows from
P(R(X) 6 G(a)) = P(R(X) 6 R(a)) = P(X 6 a) = FX(a)
that F−1
R(X)(FX(a)) 6 G(a). Therefore,
G(a) 6 F−1
R(X)(a) 6 F
−1
R(X)(FX(a)) 6 G(a)
holds by monotonicity. The desired result follows. 
To solve (6), we apply the Lagrange dual method to remove the constraint
∫ 1
0
G(z)dz − ∆ > 0
and consider the following auxiliary problem:
max
G(·)
U∆(λ,G(·)) :=
∫ 1
0
[u(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z) + λG(z)]dz − λ∆,
s.t. G(·) ∈ G.
(8)
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The existence of the optimal solutions to (6) and (8) (for each given λ ∈ R+) is established in
Appendix B, while the uniqueness is straightforward when the utility function u is strictly concave.
To derive the optimal solution to (6), we first solve (8) to obtain an optimal solution, denoted by
G˜λ(·). Then we determine λ
∗ ∈ R+ by binding the constraint
∫ 1
0
G˜λ∗(z)dz = ∆. A standard duality
argument then deduces thatG∗(·) := G˜λ∗(·) is an optimal solution to (6). Finally, an optimal solution
to (5) is given by R∗(z) = G∗(FX(z)) ∀z ∈ [0,M ] and that to (1) by I
∗(z) = z − R∗(z) ∀z ∈ [0,M ].
So our problem boils down to solving (8). However, in doing so the constraint that 0 6 G′(z) 6
(F−1X )
′(z) in G poses the major difficulty compared with Bernard et al. (2015).
3 Characterization of Solutions
In this section, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for a solution to be optimal to (8).
Assume G˜λ(·) solves (8) with a fixed λ. Let G(·) ∈ G be arbitrary and fixed. For any ε ∈ (0, 1), set
Gǫ(·) = (1− ǫ)G˜λ(·)+ ǫG(·). Then G
ǫ(·) ∈ G. By the optimality of G˜λ(·) and the concavity of u, we
have
0 >
1
ε
{∫ 1
0
[u(W∆ −G
ǫ(z))T ′(z) + λGǫ(z)] dz −
∫ 1
0
[
u(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z) + λG˜λ(z)
]
dz
}
=
1
ε
{∫ 1
0
[
(u(W∆ −G
ǫ(z))− u(W∆ − G˜λ(z)))T
′(z) + λ(Gǫ(z)− G˜λ(z))
]
dz
}
>
1
ε
{∫ 1
0
[
(u′(W∆ −G
ǫ(z)))(W∆ −G
ǫ(z)−W∆ + G˜λ(z))T
′(z) + λ(Gǫ(z)− G˜λ(z))
]
dz
}
ǫ ↓ 0
−−→
∫ 1
0
[
(u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z)))(G˜λ(z)−G(z))T
′(z) + λ(G(z)− G˜λ(z))
]
dz
=
∫ 1
0
[
u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z)− λ
]
(G˜λ(z)−G(z))dz. (9)
Define
Nλ(z) := −
∫ 1
z
[
u′(W∆ − G˜λ(t))T
′(t)− λ
]
dt, z ∈ [0, 1]. (10)
Then (9) yields
0 >
∫ 1
0
[
u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z)− λ
]
(G˜λ(z)−G(z))dz =
∫ 1
0
∫ z
0
(G˜′λ(t)−G
′(t))dtdNλ(z)
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
t
(G˜′λ(t)−G
′(t))dNλ(z)dt =
∫ 1
0
Nλ(t)(G
′(t)− G˜′λ(t))dt,
leading to ∫ 1
0
Nλ(z)G
′(z)dz 6
∫ 1
0
Nλ(z)G˜
′
λ(z)dz, ∀G(·) ∈ G.
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In other words, G˜′λ(·) maximizes
∫ 1
0
Nλ(z)G
′(z)dz over G(·) ∈ G. Therefore, a necessary condition
for G˜λ(·) to be optimal for (8) is
G˜′λ(z)
a.e.
=


0, if Nλ(z) =
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ − G˜λ(t))T
′(t)]dt < 0,
∈ [0, (F−1X )
′(z)], if Nλ(z) =
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ − G˜λ(t))T
′(t)]dt = 0,
(F−1X )
′(z), if Nλ(z) =
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ − G˜λ(t))T
′(t)]dt > 0.
(11)
It turns out that (11) completely characterizes the optimal solutions to (8).
Theorem 3.1 A function G˜λ(·) is an optimal solution to (8) if and only if G˜λ(·) ∈ G and G˜λ(·)
satisfies (11).
Proof: We only need to prove the "if" part. For any feasible G(·) in G, we have
U∆(λ, G˜λ(·))− U∆(λ,G(·))
=
∫ 1
0
[u(W∆ − G˜λ(z))− u(W∆ −G(z))]T
′(z)dz +
∫ 1
0
λ(G˜λ(z)−G(z))dz
>
∫ 1
0
u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))(G(z)− G˜λ(z))T
′(z)dz −
∫ 1
0
λ(G(z)− G˜λ(z))dz
=
∫ 1
0
N ′λ(z)(G(z)− G˜λ(z))dz =
∫ 1
0
Nλ(t)(G˜
′
λ(t)−G
′(t))dt > 0.
Hence, G˜λ(·) is optimal for (8). 
The above theorem establishes a general characterization result for the optimal solutions of (8).
This result, however, is only implicit as an optimal G˜λ(·) appears on both sides of (11). Moreover,
the derivative of G˜λ(z) is undetermined when Nλ(z) = 0. In the next two sections, we will apply
this general result to derive the solutions.
4 Model with Yaari’s Dual Criterion
When u(x) ≡ x, the corresponding V rdu reduces to the so-called Yaari’s dual criterion (Yaari 1987).
In this section we solve our insurance problem with Yaari’s criterion by applying Theorem 3.1. In
this case, the condition (11) is greatly simplified. Indeed, when u(x) ≡ x, (11) reduces to
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G˜′λ(z)
a.e.
=


0, if
∫ 1
z
(λ− T ′(t))dt = λ(1− z)− (1− T (z)) < 0,
∈ [0, (F−1X )
′(z)], if
∫ 1
z
(λ− T ′(t))dt = λ(1− z)− (1− T (z)) = 0,
(F−1X )
′(z), if
∫ 1
z
(λ− T ′(t))dt = λ(1− z)− (1− T (z)) > 0.
(12)
It should be noted that although u(x) ≡ x is not strictly concave here, the uniqueness of optimal
solution to (8) is implied by the characterizing condition (12).
To apply (12), we need to compare λ and 1−T (z)
1−z
. Define f(z) := 1−T (z)
1−z
, z ∈ [0, 1).
Lemma 4.1 The function f(·) is a continuous function on [0, 1). Moreover, under Assumption 2.3,
there exists a unique a ∈ (0, b) such that f(·) is strictly decreasing on [0, a] and strictly increasing on
[a, 1).
Proof: We have f ′(z) = (1−T (z))−T
′(z)(1−z)
(1−z)2
, z ∈ [0, 1). Let p(z) := (1 − T (z)) − T ′(z)(1 − z).
Then p′(z) = −T ′(z) + T ′(z)− T ′′(z)(1 − z) = −T ′′(z)(1 − z). It follows from Assumption 2.3 that
p′(z) > 0 for z ∈ (0, b) and p′(z) < 0 for z ∈ (b, 1). Moreover, p(0+) = 1 − T ′(0+) < 0, p(b) =
(1−T (b))−T ′(b)(1−b) =
(
1−T (b)
1−b
− T ′(b)
)
(1−b) > 0, and p(1−) = limz↑1(
1−T (z)
1−z
−T ′(z))(1−z) > 0
(noting T (·) is strictly convex on [b, 1]). So, there exists a ∈ (0, b) such that p(z) < 0 for z ∈ [0, a)
and p(z) > 0 for z ∈ (a, 1). The desired result follows. 
Clearly, f(0) = 1, f(1−) = +∞. Set λ̂ := f(a) < f(0) = 1. From the proof of Lemma 4.1, a is
determined by T ′(a) = 1−T (a)
1−a
. Let c ∈ (a, 1] be the unique scalar such that f(c) = 1 or T (c) = c.
See Figure 1 for the locations of the points a and c.
Now, we proceed by considering three cases based on the value of λ.
Case 4.1 λ 6 λ̂.
In this case, Nλ(z) = (1 − z)(λ − f(z)) < 0 ∀z ∈ [0, a) ∪ (a, 1]. It then follows from (12) that
G˜′λ(z)
a.e.
= 0; hence G˜λ(z) = 0 ∀ z ∈ [0, 1]. Thus the corresponding retention R˜λ(z) = 0 ∀z ∈ [0,M ]
and indemnity I˜λ(z) = z ∀z ∈ [0,M ], namely, the optimal contract is a full insurance contract.
Case 4.2 λ̂ < λ < 1.
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By Lemma 4.1, there exist unique x0 ∈ (0, a) and y0 ∈ (a, c) such that f(x0) = f(y0) = λ.
Accordingly, we have
Nλ(z) =


< 0, if 0 < z < x0,
> 0, if x0 < z < y0,
< 0, if y0 < z < 1.
Hence, (12) leads to the following function:
G˜λ(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < x0,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (x0), if x0 6 z < y0,
F−1X (y0)− F
−1
X (x0), if y0 6 z 6 1.
(13)
The corresponding retention and indemnity functions are, respectively,
R˜λ(z) ≡ G˜λ(FX(z)) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (x0),
z − F−1X (x0), if F
−1
X (x0) 6 z < F
−1
X (y0),
F−1X (y0)− F
−1
X (x0), if F
−1
X (y0) 6 z 6M,
and
I˜λ(z) ≡ z − R˜λ(z) =


z, if 0 6 z < F−1X (x0),
F−1X (x0), if F
−1
X (x0) 6 z < F
−1
X (y0),
z − F−1X (y0) + F
−1
X (x0), if F
−1
X (y0) 6 z 6M.
(14)
The corresponding indemnity function is illustrated by Figure 2. Qualitatively, the insurance
covers not only large losses (when z > F−1X (y0)) but also small losses (when z < F
−1
X (x0)), and the
compensation is a constant for the median range of losses. We term such a contract a threefold one.
The need for small loss coverage along with its connection to the probability weighting are amply
discussed in Bernard et al. (2015). However, in Bernard et al. (2015) the optimal indemnity is
strictly decreasing in some ranges of the losses. Such a contract may incentivize the insured to hide
partial losses in order to get more compensations. In contrast, both our indemnity and retention are
increasing functions of the loss, which will rule out this sort of moral hazard.
Case 4.3 1 6 λ < +∞
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Figure 2: A threefold contract.
By Lemma 4.1, there exists a unique z0 ∈ [c, 1] such that f(z0) = λ. Thus
Nλ(z) =


> 0, if 0 < z < z0,
< 0, if z0 < z < 1.
By (12), we have
G˜λ(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < z0,
F−1X (z0), if z0 6 z 6 1.
(15)
So
I˜λ(z) ≡ z − R˜λ(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (z0),
z − F−1X (z0), if F
−1
X (z0) 6 z 6 M.
(16)
This contract is a standard deductible contract in which only losses above a deductible point will
be covered.
We now summarize our results. Define
G¯(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < c,
F−1X (c), if c 6 z 6 1,
(17)
and let Kc :=
∫ 1
0
G¯(z)dz. Clearly Kc 6
∫ 1
0
F−1X (z)dz = E[X ].
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Proposition 4.1 Under Yaari’s criterion, u(x) ≡ x, and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3, we have the
following conclusions:
(i) If ∆ = 0, then the optimal solution to (6) is G∗(z) = 0, 0 6 z 6 1.
(ii) If 0 < ∆ < Kc, then the optimal solution to (6) is
G∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < d,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (d), if d 6 z < e,
F−1X (e)− F
−1
X (d), if e 6 z 6 1,
(18)
where (d, e) is the unique pair satisfying 0 6 d < a < e 6 c, f(d) = f(e) and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
(iii) If Kc 6 ∆ 6 E[X ], then the optimal solution to (6) is
G∗(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < q,
F−1X (q), if q 6 z 6 1,
(19)
where q the unique number satisfying c 6 q and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
Proof:
(i) When ∆ = 0, the optimal solution to (6) is trivially G∗(z) = 0, 0 6 z 6 1.
(ii) When 0 < ∆ < Kc, there exists a unique pair (d, e) such that 0 6 d < a < e 6 c, f(d) = f(e)
and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆ where G∗ is defined by (18). The existence of this pair follows from
the condition that ∆ < Kc and the definition of Kc, whereas the uniqueness comes from the
requirement that f(d) = f(e) and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆. Letting λ ≡ λ∆ := f(d), it is easy to show
that G∗(·) satisfies (12) under λ, corresponding to the aforementioned Case 4.2. This implies
that G∗(·) is optimal for (6) under ∆.
(iii) When Kc 6 ∆ 6 E[X ], a case corresponding to Case 4.3, the desired result can be derived
similarly as in (ii).
The proof is completed. 
We are now in the position to state our main result in terms of the premium π and the indemnity
function I(·). Denote by πc := (1 + ρ)(E[X ]−Kc).
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Theorem 4.2 Under Yaari’s criterion, u(x) ≡ x, and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.3, the optimal in-
demnity function I∗(·) to Problem (2) is given as
(i) If π > (1 + ρ)E[X ], then I∗(z) = z ∀z ∈ [0,M ].
(ii) If πc < π < (1 + ρ)E[X ], then
I∗(z) =


z, if 0 6 z < F−1X (d),
F−1X (d), if F
−1
X (d) 6 z < F
−1
X (e),
z − F−1X (e) + F
−1
X (d), if F
−1
X (e) 6 z 6M,
(20)
where (d, e) is the unique pair satisfying 0 6 d < a < e 6 c, f(d) = f(e) and E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
(iii) If 0 6 π 6 πc, then
I∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (q),
z − F−1X (q), if F
−1
X (q) 6 z 6M,
(21)
where q is the unique scalar satisfying c 6 q and E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
Proof: Since ∆ = E[X ]− π
1+ρ
, the constraint E[R(X)] ≡
∫ 1
0
GR(X)(z)dz = ∆ is equivalent to that
E[I(X)] = E[X ] − E[R(X)] = π
1+ρ
. The desired result is then a direct consequence of Proposition
4.1. 
The economic interpretation of this result is clear. When the premium is small (0 6 π 6 πc),
the insurance only compensates large losses in excess of certain amount. When the premium is in
middle range (πc < π < (1 + ρ)E[X ]), the contract is a threefold one, covering both small and large
losses. When the premium is sufficiently large (π > (1 + ρ)E[X ]), it is a full coverage.
It is interesting to investigate the comparative statics of the point πc (in terms of c) that triggers
the coverage for small losses. In fact, as Kc =
∫ c
0
F−1X (z)dz + F
−1
X (c)(1 − c), we have
∂Kc
∂c
= (1 −
c)(F−1X )
′(c). However, πc = (1+ρ)(E[X ]−Kc); hence
∂πc
∂c
= (1+ρ)(c−1)(F−1X )
′(c) < 0. This implies
that the insurer is more willing to be protected against small losses if his weighting function has
a bigger c. This is consistent with the fact that a bigger c renders a larger concave domain of the
probability weighting that overweighs small losses (refer to Figure 1).
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5 Model with the RDU Criterion
In this section we study the general RDU model in which the utility function is strictly concave.
Compared with the Yaari model, solving the corresponding insurance problem calls for a more
delicate analysis.
For any twice differentiable function f with f ′(x) 6= 0, define its Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute
risk aversion Af(x) := −
f ′′(x)
f ′(x)
. We now introduce the following assumptions.
Assumption 5.1 (Strictly Concave Utility) The utility function u : R+ 7→ R+ is strictly increasing
and twice differentiable. Furthermore, u′ is strictly decreasing.
Assumption 5.2 (i) The function Au(z) is decreasing on (0,∞).
(ii) AT (z) > Au(W − F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z) ∀z ∈ (0, a].
Assumption 5.1 is to replace Assumption 2.2, ensuring a genuine RDU criterion. Assumption
5.2-(i) requires that the absolute risk aversion measure of the utility function u be decreasing, which
holds true for many frequently used utility functions including logarithmic, power and exponential
utilities. In general, experimental and empirical evidences are consistent with the decreasing absolute
risk aversion; see e.g. Friend, Irwin and Blume, Marshall (1975). On the other hand, AT (z),
z ∈ (0, a], measures the level of probability weighting for small losses. The economical interpretation
of Assumption 5.2-(ii) is, therefore, that the degree of the insured’s concern for small losses is
sufficiently large relative to the absolute risk aversion of the utility function. Note that Assumption
5.2-(ii) is automatically satisfied when F−1X (z) = 0, ∀z ∈ [0, a], which is equivalent to P(X = 0) > a.
In practice, P(X = 0) > 0.5 is a plausible assumption for many insurance products such as automobile
and house insurance. On the other hand, a is very small for many commonly used inverse-S shaped
weighting functions. Take Tversky and Kahneman’s weighting function (3) as an example, a ≈ 0.013
when θ = 0.3, a ≈ 0.07 when θ = 0.5, and a ≈ 0.166 when θ = 0.8. In these cases, Assumption
5.2-(ii) holds automatically.
Problem (6) has trivial solutions in the following two cases. When ∆ = 0, the optimal solution
is G∗(z) = 0 ∀z ∈ [0, 1], corresponding to a full coverage. When ∆ = E[X ], the optimal solution is
G∗(z) = F−1X (z) ∀z ∈ [0, 1] as it is the only feasible solution, corresponding to no coverage.
So we are interested in only the case 0 < ∆ < E[X ]. It follows from Proposition C.1 in Appendix
C that there exists λ∗ such that G˜λ∗(·) is optimal solution to (8) under λ
∗ and
∫ 1
0
G˜λ∗(z)dz = ∆.
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Furthermore, recall that we have proved that (8) has a unique solution when u is strictly concave
and (11) provides the necessary and sufficient condition for the optimal solution.
Lemma 5.1 For any G(·) ∈ G, if there exists z ∈ (0, 1) such that λ − u′(W∆ − G(z))T
′(z) =∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ −G(t))T
′(t)]dt = 0, then z 6 a.
Proof: From λ− u′(W∆−G(z))T
′(z) = 0, it follows u′(W∆−G(z)) =
λ
T ′(z)
. Hence, if z > a, then
0 =
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ −G(t))T
′(t)] dt
6
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(t)] dt =
λ
T ′(z)
(1− z)
[
T ′(z)−
1− T (z)
1− z
]
< 0,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma A.1-(i) in Appendix A, noting z > a. This is a contradic-
tion. 
Lemma 5.2 Under Assumption 5.2, for any G(·) ∈ G, u′(W∆−G(z))T
′(z) is a strictly decreasing
function of z on [0, a].
Proof: NotingW∆ >W , it follows from Assumption 5.2 that AT (z) > Au(W−F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z) >
Au(W∆−F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z) ∀z ∈ (0, a]. Now, we compute the partial derivative of u′(W∆−G(z))T
′(z)
with respect to z ∈ [0, a]:
∂
∂z
(u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z))
= −u′′(W∆ −G(z))G
′(z)T ′(z) + u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′′(z)
= u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z) [Au(W∆ −G(z))G
′(z)− AT (z)]
< u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z)
[
Au(W∆ −G(z))G
′(z)− Au(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z)
]
6 u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z)
[
Au(W∆ −G(z))(F
−1
X )
′(z)− Au(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z)
]
6 u′(W∆ −G(z))T
′(z)
[
Au(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z)− Au(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))(F
−1
X )
′(z)
]
= 0.
The proof is complete. 
Now, for any λ 6 λ̂u′(W∆), we have∫ 1
z
[
λ− u′(W∆ − G˜λ(t))T
′(t)
]
dt 6
∫ 1
z
[
λ̂u′(W∆)− u
′(W∆)T
′(t)
]
dt
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= u′(W∆)
∫ 1
z
[λ̂− T ′(t)]dt = u′(W∆)(1− z)
[
λ̂−
1− T (z)
1− z
]
< 0,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.1. Hence G˜λ(z) = 0 ∀z ∈ [0, 1] is the only solution
satisfying (11). However,
∫ 1
0
G˜λ(z)dz = 0 < ∆, a contradiction. Therefore, only when λ > λ̂u
′(W∆)
is it possible for (11) to hold.
Fixing λ > λ̂u′(W∆), we now analyze the shape of the function G˜λ(·) that satisfies (11). Assume
that G˜λ(1) = k < W∆. We have Nλ(1) = 0 and λ − u
′(W∆ − k)T
′(1−) < 0 since T ′(1−) = +∞.
So, G˜′λ(z) = 0 when z is close to 1 since Nλ(z) < 0 for such z. Hence, G˜λ(z) ≡ k ∀z ∈ [z1, 1] for
some z1 ∈ [0, 1), at which Nλ(z1) = 0 and Nλ(z) < 0 for ∀z ∈ (z1, 1). Next, we consider three cases
respectively depending on the value of k.
(A) If k > W∆ − (u
′)−1(λ
λ̂
) (i.e. λ < λ̂u′(W∆ − k)), then we have, ∀z ∈ [0, 1)
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ − k)T
′(t)] dt <
∫ 1
z
[
λ̂u′(W∆ − k)− u
′(W∆ − k)T
′(t)
]
dt
= u′(W∆ − k)(1− z)
[
λ̂−
1− T (z)
1− z
]
6 0.
It then follows from (11) that G˜λ(z) ≡ k = G˜λ(0) = 0 . However, 0 = k > W∆ − (u
′)−1(λ
λ̂
), or
λ 6 λ̂u′(W∆), leading to a contradiction. So, this case in fact will not take place.
(B) If k = W∆ − (u
′)−1(λ
λ̂
), then z1 should be a. This is because
∫ 1
a
[λ− u′(W∆ − k)T
′(t)]dt = 0
and
∫ 1
z
[λ− u′(W∆ − k)T
′(t)]dt = λ
λ̂
(1 − z)(λ̂ − 1−T (z)
1−z
) < 0 for z ∈ (a, 1) by Lemma 4.1. Moreover,
λ− u′(W∆ − k)T
′(a)=0. By Lemma 5.2, λ− u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z) strictly increases with respect to
z ∈ [0, a]. It follows that λ − u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z) < 0 for z ∈ [0, a). Then (11) implies G˜′λ(z) = 0
for z ∈ (0, a). As a result, k = G˜λ(a) = G˜λ(0) = 0, or λ = λ̂u
′(W∆), which is a contradiction. So,
again, this case will not occur.
(C) If k < W∆−(u
′)−1(λ
λ̂
), then z1 ∈ (a, 1) exists. By Lemma 5.1, we have λ−u
′(W∆−k)T
′(z1) >
0. Hence, there may or may not exist z2 ∈ (0, 1) such that Nλ(z2) = 0 and Nλ(z) > 0 for z ∈ (z2, z1).
We now discuss four subcases depending on the existence and location of z2.
(C.1) If z2 does not exist or z2 = 0 (i.e. Nλ(z) > 0 for z ∈ (0, z1)), then by (11), G˜
′
λ(z) = (F
−1
X )
′(z)
for z ∈ (0, z1). Combined with the fact that G˜λ(0) = 0, we have:
G˜λ(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < z1,
F−1X (z1), if z1 6 z 6 1.
This corresponds to a deductible contract.
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(C.2) If z2 exists and z2 ∈ (0, a], then G˜
′
λ(z) = (F
−1
X )
′(z) for z ∈ (z2, z1) in view of (11).
Combining the property of z1 and z2, we deduce λ−u
′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2) 6 0. Then, using Lemma
5.2, we have λ − u′(W∆ − G˜λ(z))T
′(z) < 0 for z ∈ [0, z2). It follows from (11) that G˜
′
λ(z) = 0 for
z ∈ (0, z2). In this case, we can express G˜λ(·) as follows
G˜λ(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < z2,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (z2), if z2 6 z < z1,
F−1X (z1)− F
−1
X (z2), if z1 6 z 6 1.
This is the threefold contract, depicted in Figure 2.
(C.3) If z2 exists and z2 ∈ (b, 1) (recall that b is the turning point where the weighting function
T (·) changes from being concave to convex), then a similar analysis as in Case C.2 shows that λ −
u′(W∆−G˜λ(z1))T
′(z1) > 0 and λ−u
′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2) < 0. This means u
′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2) >
u′(W∆− G˜λ(z1))T
′(z1). However, u
′(W∆− G˜λ(z1)) > u
′(W∆− G˜λ(z2)) > 0 and T
′(z1) > T
′(z2) > 0,
which is a contradiction. So, this case is not feasible.
(C.4) If z2 exists and z2 ∈ (a, b], then λ − u
′(W∆ − G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2) < 0. We prove G˜λ(z) ≡
G˜λ(z2) ∀z ∈ [0, z2]. In fact, if it is false, then there exists z3 such that
∫ z2
z3
[λ−u′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(t)]dt =
0 and
∫ z2
z
[λ−u′(W∆− G˜λ(z2))T
′(t)]dt < 0 for z ∈ (z3, z2). However, λ−u
′(W∆− G˜λ(z2))T
′(z) < λ−
u′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2) < 0 for z ∈ (z3, z2) since z2 ∈ (a, b]. So,
∫ z2
z3
[λ−u′(W∆−G˜λ(z2))T
′(t)]dt < (λ−
u′(W∆− G˜λ(z2))T
′(z2))(z2− z3) < 0, arriving at a contradiction. Therefore, k = F
−1
X (z1)−F
−1
X (z2).
From
∫ 1
z1
[λ − u′(W∆ − k)T
′(t)]dt = 0, it follows λ = u′(W∆ − k)
1−T (z1)
1−z1
= u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2) −
F−1X (z1))
1−T (z1)
1−z1
. However,∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2)− F
−1
X (z1))
1− T (z1)
1− z1
− u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2)− F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2)− F
−1
X (z1))
1− T (z1)
1− z1
− u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2)− F
−1
X (z1))T
′(t)
]
dt
= u′(W∆ + F
−1
X (z2)− F
−1
X (z1))(z1 − z2)
[
1− T (z1)
1− z1
−
T (z1)− T (z2)
z1 − z2
]
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma A.1-(ii) in Appendix A. This is a contradiction. So,
the current case will not occur either.
To summarize, for any λ > λ̂u′(W∆), only deductible and threefold contracts are possibly optimal,
stipulated in Case C.1 and Case C.2 above. Next, we investigate these two cases more closely.
Define a function h∆(·) on [a, c] as follows:
h∆(z) :=
∫ z
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))(1− T (z))
1− z
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt. (22)
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Then, by using Lemma 5.2 and the fact that 1−T (a)
1−a
= T ′(a), we have
h∆(a) =
∫ a
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (a))T
′(a)− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt < 0.
Recalling that T (c) = c, we have
h∆(c) =
∫ c
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (c))(1− T (c))
1− c
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
=
∫ c
0
[u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (c))− u
′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)]dt
> u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (c))c−
∫ c
0
[u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (c))T
′(t)]dt = 0.
Moreover, we take the derivative of h∆(z) with respect to z ∈ [a, c] to obtain
h′∆(z) = −u
′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z) + u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))
1 − T (z)
1− z
−u′′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))
1 − T (z)
1− z
z(F−1X )
′(z) + u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))z
1−T (z)
1−z
− T ′(z)
1− z
= u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))
(
1− T (z)
1− z
− T ′(z)
)
− u′′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))
1 − T (z)
1− z
z(F−1X )
′(z)
+u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))z
1−T (z)
1−z
− T ′(z)
1− z
> 0.
Hence, there exists a unique point l∆ ∈ (a, c) such that h∆(l∆) = 0, h∆(z) < 0 for z ∈ (a, l∆), and
h∆(z) > 0 for z ∈ (l∆, c).
Define
G(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < l∆,
F−1X (l∆), if l∆ 6 z 6 1,
(23)
and K∆ :=
∫ 1
0
G(z)dz.
Proposition 5.1 If K∆ 6 ∆ < E[X ], then the optimal solution to (6) is
G∗(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < f,
F−1X (f), if f 6 z 6 1,
(24)
where f is the unique scalar such that f > l∆ and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
Proof: The existence of f follows from the monotonicity of G∗ with respesct to f immediately.
Denoting λ∆ := u
′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))
1−T (f)
1−f
, we need to show that G∗(·) satisfies (11) with λ = λ∆.
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First, it is straightforward that
∫ 1
f
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(f))(1−T (f))
1−f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))T
′(t)
]
dt = 0. Next, we
are to prove that
∫ f
z
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(f))(1−T (f))
1−f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt > 0 ∀z ∈ (0, f). We divide
the proof into two cases.
• If z ∈ [a, f), then∫ f
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ f
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))T
′(t)
]
dt
=u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(f − z)
[
1− T (f)
1− f
−
1− T (z)
1− z
]
> 0,
where the last inequality is due to Lemma 4.1.
• If z ∈ (0, a) and u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z) 6
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(f))(1−T (f))
1−f
, then by Lemma 5.2 and the
result above, we have∫ f
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
=
∫ a
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
+
∫ f
a
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ a
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ a
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z)− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt > 0.
If z ∈ (0, a) and u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z) >
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(f))(1−T (f))
1−f
holds, then
∫ f
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
=
∫ f
l∆
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
+
∫ l∆
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ l∆
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
>
∫ l∆
z
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (l∆))(1− T (l∆))
1− l∆
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
=
∫ l∆
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (l∆))(1− T (l∆))
1− l∆
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
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−∫ z
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (l∆))(1− T (l∆))
1− l∆
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt
=−
∫ z
0
[
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (l∆))(1− T (l∆))
1− l∆
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt > 0,
where the last inequality is due to
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z) >
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (f))(1− T (f))
1− f
>
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (l∆))(1− T (l∆))
1− l∆
,
as l∆ 6 f and the fact that u
′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z) is strictly decreasing on [0, a].
The claim follows now. 
Lemma 5.3 If 0 < ∆ < K∆, then the corresponding optimal contract is not a deductible one.
Proof: There exists λ∗ such that G˜λ∗(·) satisfies (11) under λ
∗ and
∫ 1
0
G˜λ∗(z)dz = ∆ (see Appendix
C). If G˜λ∗(·) corresponds to a deductible contract, then there exists z (since ∆ < K∆, we have z < l∆)
such that
G˜λ∗(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < z,
F−1X (z), if z 6 z 6 1.
(25)
Since G˜λ∗(·) satisfies (11), we have
∫ 1
z
[λ∗ − u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(t)]dt = 0, or λ∗ = u′(W∆ −
F−1X (z))
1−T ′(z)
1−z
.
On the other hand, M(z) :=
∫ z
z
[u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))
1−T ′(z)
1−z
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)]dt > 0 for
z ∈ [0, z]. However, by the definition of l∆, h∆(z) ≡ M(0) =
∫ z
0
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z))(1−T (z))
1−z
− u′(W∆ −
F−1X (t))T
′(t)]dt < 0 as z < l∆. Since M(·) is a continuous function, a contradiction arises. 
It follows from Lemma 5.3 that, if 0 < ∆ < K∆, the optimal contract (which always exists) can
only be a threefold one, corresponding to Case C.2. We are now led to the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 If 0 < ∆ < K∆, then the optimal solution to (6) is given as
G∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < z2,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (z2), if z2 6 z < z1,
F−1X (z1)− F
−1
X (z2), if z1 6 z 6 1,
23
where z2, z1 are such that z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) +
F−1X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0 and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
Proof: The conclusion is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.3. 
Note that any pair (z2, z1) satisfying the requirements in Proposition 5.2 leads to an optimal
solution to (6). Therefore such a pair (z2, z1) is unique as the optimal solution to (6) is unique.
Proposition 5.1 and Proposition 5.2 give two qualitatively distinct optimal contracts for any given
0 < ∆ < E[X ], and the two cases are divided depending on whether or not ∆ < K∆. However,
K∆ in general depends on ∆ in an implicit and complicated way; so it is hard to compare ∆ and
K∆. Nevertheless we are able to treat at least two cases where Au(z) is either a constant or strictly
decreasing in z.
First, assume that the utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion, e.g. u(z) = 1−e−αz
∀z ∈ R+. Then it is easy to see from (22) that l∆ is independent of ∆, and hence so is K∆. In this
case, denote K ≡ K∆ and π̂ = (1 + ρ)(E[X ]−K). Then we have the following result.
Theorem 5.4 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, and 5.2 hold, and that u(·) exhibits constant
absolute risk aversion. Then the optimal indemnity function I∗(·) to Problem (2) is given as
(i) If π = (1 + ρ)E[X ], then I∗(z) = z for z ∈ [0,M ].
(ii) If π̂ < π < (1 + ρ)E[X ], then
I∗(z) =


z, if 0 6 z < F−1X (z2),
F−1X (z2), if F
−1
X (z2) 6 z < F
−1
X (z1),
z − F−1X (z1) + F
−1
X (z2), if F
−1
X (z1) 6 z 6M,
where (z2, z1) is the unique pair satisfying z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
−
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) + F
−1
X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0, and E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
(iii) If 0 6 π 6 π̂, then
I∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (f),
z − F−1X (f), if F
−1
X (f) 6 z 6M,
where f is the unique scalar satisfying E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
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Proof: The result follows from Propositions 5.1, 5.2 and the fact that K∆ is a constant for any
0 < ∆ < E[X ]. 
Now, we study the case in which Au(z) is strictly decreasing. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 If 0 < ∆1 < ∆2 < E[X ], then a < l∆1 < l∆2 < c.
Proof: According to definition of l∆1, we have
h∆1(l∆1) =
∫ l∆1
0
[
u′(W∆1 − F
−1
X (l∆1))(1− T (l∆1))
1− l∆1
− u′(W∆1 − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt = 0.
Since W∆1 < W∆2 , we have
u′(W∆2−F
−1
X
(l∆1 ))
u′(W∆1−F
−1
X
(l∆1 ))
<
u′(W∆2−F
−1
X
(t))
u′(W∆1−F
−1
X
(t))
for t ∈ [0, l∆1) by Lemma A.2 in
Appendix A. Hence
h∆2(l∆1) =
∫ l∆1
0
[
u′(W∆2 − F
−1
X (l∆1))(1− T (l∆1))
1− l∆1
− u′(W∆2 − F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt < 0.
As a result h∆2(l∆1) < 0, h∆2(c) > 0. Since h
′
∆2
(z) > 0 for z ∈ [l∆1, c), we get l∆2 ∈ (l∆1 , c). 
Define ∆(d) :=
∫ d
0
F−1X (z)dz +
∫ 1
d
F−1X (d)dz =
∫ d
0
F−1X (z)dz + F
−1
X (d)(1 − d) on d ∈ [a, c]. Then
∆′(d) = (1−d)(F−1X )
′(d) > 0. Hence, ∆(·) is a continuous and strictly increasing function. Determine
l∆(a) and l∆(c) by h∆(a)(l∆(a)) = 0 and h∆(c)(l∆(c)) = 0, and set ∆˜ := ∆(l∆(a)) and ∆ := ∆(l∆(c)).
Finally, define a function g(·) on [a, c] as follows:
g(z) :=
∫ z
0
[
u′(W0 + (1 + ρ)∆(z) − F
−1
X (z))(1 − T (z))
1− z
− u′(W0 + (1 + ρ)∆(z)− F
−1
X (t))T
′(t)
]
dt.
Proposition 5.3 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, and 5.2 hold and that Au(·) is strictly decreas-
ing. Then the optimal solution to (6) is given as
(i) If ∆ = 0, then G∗(z) = 0 ∀0 6 z 6 1.
(ii) If 0 < ∆ 6 ∆˜, then
G∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < z2,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (z2), if z2 6 z < z1,
F−1X (z1)− F
−1
X (z2), if z1 6 z 6 1,
(26)
where z2, z1 are such that z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) +
F−1X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0, and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
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(iii) If ∆˜ < ∆ < ∆, then let p ∈ (l∆(a), l∆(c)) such that ∆(p) = ∆. If g(p) < 0, then
G∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < z2,
F−1X (z)− F
−1
X (z2), if z2 6 z < z1,
F−1X (z1)− F
−1
X (z2), if z1 6 z 6 1,
(27)
where z2, z1 are such that z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
− u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) +
F−1X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0, and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆. If g(p) > 0, then
G∗(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < f,
F−1X (f), if f 6 z 6 1,
(28)
where f is such that f < l∆(c) and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
(iv) If ∆ 6 ∆ 6 E[X ], then
G∗(z) =


F−1X (z), if 0 6 z < f,
F−1X (f), if f 6 z 6 1,
(29)
where f is such that f > l∆(c) and
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆.
Proof: (i),(ii) and (iv) are direct consequences of Proposition 5.1, 5.2 and Lemma 5.5. For (iii),
there is a unique p ∈ (l∆(a), l∆(c)) such that ∆(p) = ∆, which follows from the definition of ∆˜, ∆
and the fact that ∆(·) is a continuous and strictly increasing function. If g(p) < 0, then h∆(p) < 0;
hence l∆ > p. Therefore, ∆ < K∆. The desired result follows from Proposition 5.2. The proof for
g(p) > 0 is similar. 
Let us give the result in terms of premium and indemnity function.
Theorem 5.6 Assume that Assumptions 2.1, 2.3, and 5.2 hold, and that Au(·) is strictly decreasing.
Then the optimal indemnity function I∗(·) to Problem (1) is given as
(i) If π = (1 + ρ)E[X ], then I∗(z) = z ∀z ∈ [0,M ].
(ii) If (1 + ρ)(E[X ]− ∆˜) 6 π < (1 + ρ)E[X ], then
I∗(z) =


z, if 0 6 z < F−1X (z2),
F−1X (z2), if F
−1
X (z2) 6 z < F
−1
X (z1),
z − F−1X (z1) + F
−1
X (z2), if F
−1
X (z1) 6 z 6M,
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where (z2, z1) is the unique pair satisfying z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
−
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) + F
−1
X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0, and E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
(iii) If (1 + ρ)(E[X ] − ∆) < π < (1 + ρ)(E[X ] − ∆˜), then let p ∈ (l∆(a), l∆(c)) such that ∆(p) =
E[X ]− π
1+ρ
. If g(p) < 0, then
I∗(z) =


z, if 0 6 z < F−1X (z2),
F−1X (z2), if F
−1
X (z2) 6 z < F
−1
X (z1),
z − F−1X (z1) + F
−1
X (z2), if F
−1
X (z1) 6 z 6M,
where (z2, z1) is the unique pair satisfying z2 6 a 6 z1,
∫ z1
z2
[
u′(W∆−F
−1
X
(z1)+F
−1
X
(z2))(1−T (z1))
1−z1
−
u′(W∆ − F
−1
X (t) + F
−1
X (z2))T
′(t)]dt = 0, and E[I∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
. If g(p) > 0, then
I∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (f),
z − F−1X (f), if F
−1
X (f) 6 z 6M,
where q is the unique number satisfying f < l∆(c) and E[I
∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
(iv) If 0 6 π 6 (1 + ρ)(E[X ]−∆), then
I∗(z) =


0, if 0 6 z < F−1X (f),
z − F−1X (f), if F
−1
X (f) 6 z 6M,
where q is the unique number satisfying f > l∆(c) and E[I
∗(X)] = π
1+ρ
.
Proof: It follows easily from Proposition 5.3. 
6 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we use a numerical example to illustrate our result with a given premium π. we take
the same numerical setting as in Bernard et al. (2015) for a comparison purpose: The loss X follows
a truncated exponential distribution with the density function f(x) = me
−mx
1−e−mM
, where the intensity
parameter m = 0.1, and M = 10. The initial wealth W0 = 15, and u(x) = 1 − e
−γx with γ = 0.02.
Moreover, ρ = 0.2 and π = 3. Finally, the weighting function Tθ(x) =
xθ
(xθ+(1−x)θ)
1
θ
with θ = 0.5. We
can verify that the assumptions of Theorem 5.4 is satisfied under this setting.
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Figure 3: Our result vs Bernard et al. (2015).
The optimal indemnity obtained by Bernard et al. (2015) is plotted in blue in Figure 3. We
note that in the result of Bernard et al. (2015), if the loss is between 1 and 2, then the insured has
the incentive to hide part of the loss in order to be paid with a larger compensation. By contrast,
our indemnity function, depicted in red, is increasing and any increment in compensations is always
less than or equal to the increment in losses. It effectively rules out the aforementioned behavior of
moral hazard.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied an optimal insurance design problem where the insured has the RDU
preference. There are documented evidences proving that this preference captures human behaviors
better than the EU preference. The main contribution of our work is that our optimal contracts
are monotone with respect to losses, thereby eliminating the potential problem of moral hazard
associated with the existing results.
An interesting conclusion from our results is that, under our assumptions (in particular Assump-
tion 5.2-(ii)), there are only two types of non-trivial optimal contracts possible, one being the classical
deductible and the other the threefold contract covering both small and large losses.
While we have demonstrated that Assumption 5.2-(ii) holds for many economically interesting
cases, removing this assumption remains a mathematically outstanding open problem.
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A Some Lemmas
In this part, we prove some lemmas which have been used in Section 5.
Lemma A.1 Assume T (·) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] satisfies Assumption 2.3. We have the following results:
(i) If a < z, then T ′(z) < 1−T (z)
1−z
.
(ii) If a < z2 < b and z2 < z1 < 1, then
1−T (z1)
1−z1
>
T (z1)−T (z2)
z1−z2
.
Proof: (i) If a < z 6 b, then T ′(z) < T ′(a) < 1−T (z)
1−z
. If b < z, then T ′(z) < 1−T (z)
1−z
since T (·) is
convex and strictly increasing on [b, 1].
(ii) Since 1− T (z1), 1− z1, T (z1)− T (z2), and z1 − z2 are all strictly positive, we have
1− T (z1)
1− z1
>
T (z1)− T (z2)
z1 − z2
⇐⇒
1− T (z1)
1− z1
>
(1− T (z1)) + (T (z1)− T (z2))
(1− z1) + (z1 − z2)
⇐⇒
1− T (z1)
1− z1
>
1− T (z2)
1− z2
.
However, 1−T (z1)
1−z1
>
1−T (z2)
1−z2
follows from Lemma 4.1. 
For fixed x > 0, define q(z) := u′(x+ z)u′(x− z) on z ∈ (0, x).
Lemma A.2 If −u
′′(z)
u′(z)
is strictly decreasing, then q(z) is a strictly increasing function on z ∈ (0, x).
Proof: We take derivative:
q′(z) = u′′(x+ z)u′(x− z)− u′(x+ z)u′′(x− z)
= u′(x+ z)u′(x− z)
[
(−
u′′(x− z)
u′(x− z)
)− (−
u′′(x+ z)
u′(x+ z)
)
]
> 0.
Hence, we get the result. 
B Existence of Optimal Solutions to (6) and (8)
We first prove that the constraint set G is compact under some norm. We consider all the con-
tinuous functions on [0, 1], denoted as C[0, 1]. Define a metric between x(·), y(·) as ρ(x(·), y(·)) =
max06t61 |x(t) − y(t)|, ∀x(·), y(·) ∈ C[0, 1]. Clearly, C[0, 1] is a metric space under ρ. By Arzela–
Ascoli’s theorem, for any sequence (Gn(·))n∈N in G, there exists a subsequence Gnk(·) that converges
in C[0, 1] under ρ.
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Lemma B.1 The feasible set G is compact under ρ.
Proof: For any sequence (Gn(·))n∈N in G , there exists a subsequence Gnk(·) that uniformly
converges in G∗(·) ∈ C[0, 1]. We now prove that G∗(·) ∈ G. If there exist a > b such that
G∗(b)−G∗(a) = η > 0, then take ε := 1
3
η. If follows from the uniform convergence that there exists
K such that ρ(Gnk(·), G
∗(·)) 6 ε ∀ k > K. Hence, 0 < η = G∗(b) − G∗(a) = G∗(b) − Gnk(b) +
Gnk(b)−Gnk(a) +Gnk(a)−G
∗(a) 6 ε+ 0 + ε = 2
3
η ∀ k > K, which is a contradiction. This proves
that 0 6 G∗(a)−G∗(b) ∀a > b. Similarly, we can prove that G∗(a)−G∗(b) 6 F−1X (a)− F
−1
X (b). 
The existence of optimal solutions to (6) and (8) can be established now. For example, for (8),
let vλ(∆) be the optimal value of (8) under given λ and ∆. We can take a sequence (Gn(·))n∈N in G
such that vλ(∆) = limn↑+∞ U∆(λ,Gn(·)). Then, according to Lemma B.1, there exists a subsequence
Gnk(·) converging to G
∗(·) in G and G∗(·) is optimal solution to (8). For (6), the proof is similar.
C Existence of Lagrangian Multiplier to (6)
For the following lemma, refer to Komiya (1988) for an elementary proof.
Lemma C.1 (Sion’s Minimax Theorem) Let X be a compact convex subset of a linear topological
space and Y a convex subset of a linear topological space. If f is a real-valued function on X × Y
such that f(x, ·) is continuous and concave on Y ∀x ∈ X, and f(·, y) is continuous and convex on
X ∀y ∈ Y , then, min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
f(x, y) = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
f(x, y).
Proposition C.1 For any 0 < ∆ < E[X ], there is λ∗ such that G˜λ∗(·) is optimal solution to (8)
under λ∗ and
∫ 1
0
G˜λ∗(z)dz = ∆.
Proof: Let ∆ be given with 0 < ∆ < E[X ]. Denote by G∗(·) the optimal solution to (6) under ∆
(it is easy to show
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆) and by G˜λ(·) the optimal solution to (8) under λ and ∆. Denote
by v(∆) and v(λ,∆) be respectively the optimal values of (6) and (8).
We first prove that v(λ,∆) is a convex function in λ for given ∆. Noting that U∆(λ,G(·)) is
linear in λ for any given G(·), we have
v(αλ1 + (1− α)λ2,∆) = max
G(·)
U∆(αλ1 + (1− α)λ2, G(·))
= max
G(·)
{αU∆(λ1, G(·)) + (1− α)U∆(λ2, G(·))}
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6 max
G(·)
{αU∆(λ1, G(·))}+max
G(·)
{(1− α)U∆(λ2, G(·))}
= αmax
G(·)
{U∆(λ1, G(·))}+ (1− α)max
G(·)
{U∆(λ2, G(·))}
= αv(λ1,∆) + (1− α)v(λ2,∆).
Moreover, by Sion’s minimax theorem, the following equality holds: max
06λ
min
G(·)∈G
−U∆(λ,G(·)) =
min
G(·)∈G
max
06λ
−U∆(λ,G(·)); hence min
06λ
max
G(·)∈G
U∆(λ,G(·)) = max
G(·)∈G
min
06λ
U∆(λ,G(·)). Finally, we have
v(∆) = inf06λ v(λ,∆) (i.e. min
06λ
max
G(·)∈G
U∆(λ,G(·)) = U∆(G
∗(·))).
Let us denote λ := v(∆)+1∫ 1
0
F−1
X
(z)dz−∆
= U∆(G
∗(·))+1
E[X]−∆
. For any λ > λ, we have
v(λ,∆) = max
G(·)∈G
U∆(λ,G(·)) > U∆(λ, F
−1
X (z)))
=
∫ 1
0
u(W∆ − F
−1
X (z))T
′(z)dz + λ(
∫ 1
0
F−1X (z)dz −∆) > λ(
∫ 1
0
F−1X (z)dz −∆)
> λ(
∫ 1
0
F−1X (z)dz −∆) (since
∫ 1
0
F−1X (z)dz > ∆)
= v(∆) + 1,
which yields v(∆) = inf06λ v(λ,∆) = inf06λ6λ v(λ,∆).
Therefore, by using the convexity of v(λ,∆), we can find the optimal λ∗ ∈ [0, λ] minimizes the
right part, and satisfies that v(∆) = v(λ∗,∆). Moreover,
v(λ∗,∆) > U∆(λ
∗, G∗(·)) =
∫ 1
0
u(W∆ −G
∗(z))T ′(z)dz + λ∗(
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz −∆)
=
∫ 1
0
[u(W∆ −G
∗(z))T ′(z)]dz = U∆(G
∗(·)) = v(∆).
The second equality comes from the fact that G∗(·) is the optimal solution to (6) under ∆; hence∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆. By v(∆) = v(λ∗,∆) and v(λ∗,∆) > U∆(λ
∗, G∗(·)) = v(∆), we have G∗(·) is optimal
solution to (8) under given λ∗. And, by uniqueness of optimal solutions to (8), we know that G∗(·)
is the unique optimal solution to (8) under given λ∗ and satisfying
∫ 1
0
G∗(z)dz = ∆. 
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